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The present study examined the relationship between procrastination, delay,
blameworthiness, and moral responsibility. Undergraduate students (N = 240) were
provided two scenarios in which the reason for inaction (procrastination, delay), the
target (self, other), and the outcome (positive, negative) were manipulated, and students
were asked to rate the moral responsibility and blameworthiness of the agent. Results
indicated that individuals who procrastinated were seen as more morally responsible
and blameworthy than those who experienced delay. More specifically, after a negative
outcome, procrastination was associated with more moral responsibility, whereas delay
was associated with less moral responsibility. After a positive outcome, individuals
perceived procrastination as deserving of less moral responsibility, and delays as
associated with more moral responsibility. Finally, a three-way interaction showed that
participants rated procrastination that resulted in failure as deserving of responsibility
when engaged in by others as opposed to oneself.
Keywords: academic procrastination, moral responsibility, blame, attribution theory, experimental philosophy
INTRODUCTION
Procrastination is an everyday occurrence observed in various domains, and is particularly
apparent in academic settings with an estimated 80–95% of college students reporting that they
engage in this self-defeating behavior (Ellis and Knaus, 1977; Schouwenburg, 1995; O’Brien,
unpublished doctoral dissertation) and an estimated 90% engaging in procrastination at least
1 hour a day (Klassen et al., 2008). Procrastination refers to the voluntary, needless delay of an
intended act despite expecting negative consequences for this delay, and has been found to be
strongly associated with emotions, such as guilt (Pychyl et al., 2000) and shame (Fee and Tangney,
2000; Wohl et al., 2010). These powerful negative emotions reflect a judgment about oneself with
respect to moral responsibility, and are specific to procrastination as opposed to other forms of
delay. While all procrastination is delay, not all delay is procrastination (Pychyl, 2013). In contrast
to reasoned delay aimed at facilitating goal attainment in achievement settings, or external delays
beyond one’s personal control, procrastination represents a needless gap between intention and
action that is indicative of self-regulation failure (Sirois and Pychyl, 2013).
From an experimental philosophy perspective, findings indicate that individuals are more
likely to perceive others as responsible for morally objectionable behaviors (seen as intentional)
when they have negative consequences that lead to feelings of blame and punishment (Knobe,
2003). Similarly, social-psychological research based on attribution theory suggests that perceiving
others as responsible for their negative experiences (seen as personally controllable) leads to
more anger and less assistance (Weiner, 2006). Given the relevance of both philosophical
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and social-psychological research on perceived responsibility
concerning blameworthy actions, this study evaluated students’
perceptions of responsibility and blameworthiness with respect
to procrastination in educational settings as compared to
experienced delay. Furthermore, the present study explored
the extent to which students’ perceptions surrounding
procrastination and delay were affected by the consequences
of these behaviors (positive versus negative), as well as who
experienced them (self versus others).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Procrastination Behavior
Procrastination is defined in psychological research as voluntarily
delaying an intended course of action, despite the expectation
of being worse off for that delay (Steel, 2007). Procrastination
is also associated with attending to one’s immediate needs
despite possible negative consequences (Sirois and Pychyl, 2013),
potentially for motivational or affective reasons (Baumeister and
Heatherton, 1996; Tice and Bratslavsky, 2000). Procrastination
research further suggests that individuals are more likely to
postpone tasks that are unpleasant (Milgram et al., 1988;
Blunt and Pychyl, 2000) or when task rewards are more distal
(Steel, 2007). Procrastination is thus commonly understood as
occurring when individuals cognitively focus on their present
self as opposed to their future self, and in so doing, sabotage
their long-term emotional well-being and success by shifting the
behavioral and psychological burden to their future self (Tice and
Bratslavsky, 2000; Sirois and Pychyl, 2013; Krause and Freund,
2014). Moreover, procrastination is typically evaluated in relation
to affect-related factors, with people being more likely to engage
in avoidance behaviors as a deadline approaches (Wohl et al.,
2010) to minimize negative emotions such as shame, guilt, and
regret (Higgins et al., 1994; Fee and Tangney, 2000; Blunt and
Pychyl, 2005).
This primacy of present self over future self, the tendency
to “give in to feel good,” is characterized more broadly in
psychological research as self-regulation failure (Baumeister
et al., 1994; Tice and Bratslavsky, 2000). Self-regulation
failure occurs despite goal-setting and self-monitoring due
to an inordinate focus on escaping negative moods (i.e.,
Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996). Consequently, individuals
often choose to repair their mood through avoidance behaviors
such as procrastination (Sirois and Pychyl, 2013) as opposed
to goal-oriented approach behaviors (Higgins et al., 1994).
Procrastination has long been described in philosophical
literature as a weakness of will, or “akrasia,” in which one acts
against one’s better judgment (Searle, 2001; Kalis et al., 2008;
Pychyl, 2011). Accordingly, self-regulation failure or akrasia
can be explained as a conflict between what one feels they
should be doing (duty) and what one is actually doing (action).
Furthermore, this postponement of effort is understood as
representing a lack of moral character – a direct violation
of one’s responsibilities to oneself and others (Andreou and
White, 2010) – underscoring the morally unacceptable nature of
procrastination.
In educational settings, students who procrastinate tend
to demonstrate greater negative affect (e.g., guilt, shame;
Fee and Tangney, 2000), poorer study habits (e.g., Solomon
and Rothblum, 1984), and lower grades relative to non-
procrastinators (e.g., Klassen et al., 2008; Corkin et al., 2011;
Kim and Seo, 2015). Academic procrastination is also typically
viewed as resulting from low motivation (Senécal et al., 1995;
Cerino, 2014), perfectionism (Burnam et al., 2014), and occurs
when students do not enjoy academic tasks and perceive
them to have little benefit (Schraw et al., 2007) or personal
value (Fischer, 2001). As such, academic procrastination is
commonly associated with detrimental behavioral choices as
well as emotions implicating personal culpability, warranting
further investigation of moral perceptions of this maladaptive
strategy.
An Experimental Philosophy Perspective
Research conducted in the experimental philosophy domain
explores the nature of folk intuitions regarding traditional
philosophical constructs, such as morality and free will, through
the use of controlled experiments and statistical analyses
(e.g., Knobe, 2006). Thus, whereas psychology research has
focussed primarily on identifying the antecedents, correlates,
and consequences of learners’ behaviors in academic settings,
experimental philosophy researchers use similar techniques
to evaluate individual’s general beliefs surrounding the
intentionality and morality of these behaviors in themselves and
others. More specifically, traditional philosophical perspectives
suggest that an agent is viewed as morally responsible for
an outcome if it results from an active choice – an exercise
of free will (Kant, 1785). However, other philosophical work
proposes that an agent may be deemed morally responsible
for an outcome if that outcome is simply attributed to the
agent as having caused it, regardless of volition or intent (Levy,
2005).
Recent work by experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe
has addressed the stereotyped beliefs held by individuals
concerning the intentionality, morality, and blameworthiness
of the outcomes they experience (positive versus negative).
In experimental research involving scenarios that examined
the folk-psychological concept of intention, findings showed
individuals’ beliefs concerning the intentionality of an outcome
to be dependent on evaluative assumptions concerning the
agent (Knobe, 2006). In these studies, participants were more
likely to believe that an agent intentionally caused a morally
reprehensible outcome (i.e., harming others) if the agent knew
it might occur. Although the negative outcome may have not
been explicitly intended (i.e., was a side-effect of an action having
other benefits), it was anticipated by the agent as a possibility
thus causing that negative outcome to be viewed as intentional
by participants (Knobe, 2003). Conversely, participants did not
view the side-effects of an action to be intentional if that
outcome was morally respectable in nature (i.e., helping others).
Overall, this research suggests that perceptions of intentionality
for others’ behaviors tend to be biased by the moral significance
of the outcome, even if the intentionality of the behavior is
debatable.
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JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY:
ATTRIBUTION THEORY
Research from a social-psychological perspective has also
addressed the extent to which individuals are judged as personally
responsible for a given outcome, and more specifically, how
stereotyped beliefs concerning intentionality can bias one’s
explanations for why an event occurred. According to Weiner’s
(2006) attribution theory, individuals’ perceptions of personal
controllability over an outcome should predict judgments of
responsibility that lead to specific emotions and behaviors. More
specifically, if an event that happens to oneself is seen as
personally controllable (e.g., lack of effort), one would typically
believe they were responsible for the event, experience hope
and guilt, and be more likely to persist in the future. In
contrast, if one views an event experienced by another individual
as controllable by that individual, one would likely perceive
that individual as responsible, feel anger toward the person,
and behave negatively toward them (e.g., neglect, reprimand,
retaliation; Weiner, 2000).
However, research in social psychology has long demonstrated
that the type of attribution individuals select may be biased
by whether the event happened to oneself or another. As
highlighted in classic research on the actor/observer bias (Jones
and Nisbett, 1971), the hedonic bias, and the fundamental
attribution error (Ross, 1977), individuals tend to attribute
positive experiences to internal factors (within themselves) and
negative experiences to external factors (outside themselves). For
example, whereas a student would be expected to take credit
for a good grade, they would further be expected to attribute a
bad grade to test difficulty. Conversely, people tend to attribute
negative events that happen to others primarily to internal
factors (e.g., poor test performance of a peer being attributed
to factors within that individual). Taken together, both social-
psychological and experimental-philosophy perspectives suggest
that people are more motivated to blame others for negative
as opposed to positive outcomes, particularly when a behavior
that contributed to the outcome is considered intentional in
nature.
The social-psychological and experimental philosophy
literatures are also similar in their shared emphasis on
differentiating between cognitive and affective constructs
when describing how people think about intentionality. In
Weiner’s (2006) attribution theory, one’s cognitions surrounding
the intentionality of an event (e.g., perceived controllability,
responsibility) are presented as conceptually distinct from the
emotions that follow (e.g., guilt, anger, sympathy). Similarly,
perceptions of intentionality or responsibility are described
by Knobe (2003) as leading to feelings of “blameworthiness,”
a construct also described by Weiner (2006) as distinct
from “affectively neutral” responsibility beliefs in conveying
“emotional negativity” (due to its moral basis). Thus, although
research in experimental philosophy to date does not distinguish
between perceptions of intentionality for events that happen
to oneself versus others (e.g., Knobe, 2003), findings from
both philosophy and social psychology (e.g., Weiner, 2006)
highlight how the moral relevance of a behavior or outcome
can bias perceptions of its intentionality, and the importance
of evaluating both cognitive and affective consequences of
individuals’ beliefs concerning intentional behaviors (e.g.,
responsibility versus blame).
THE PRESENT STUDY
The present study aimed to experimentally investigate students’
perceptions of responsibility and blameworthiness to address
a current lack of research on how procrastination and its
outcomes are perceived by oneself and others in educational
settings. The scenario study protocols are consistent with
relevant research in social psychology (Weiner et al., 1997)
and experimental philosophy (Knobe, 2003, 2006) in evaluating
students’ perceptions of intentionality with respect to (a)
procrastination versus delays resulting in (b) a positive or
negative outcome that (c) occurs to oneself or another. It was
hypothesized that higher levels of perceived responsibly and
blameworthiness would be observed for scenarios depicting
(i) procrastination versus delay (Knobe, 2003), (ii) negative
versus positive outcomes (Knobe, 2006; Weiner, 2006), and
for (iii) others versus oneself (Ross, 1977). In addition,
two-way interactions were anticipated with higher levels of
perceived responsibility and blameworthiness expected for (iv)
procrastination resulting in negative versus positive outcomes
(Knobe, 2006; Weiner, 2006), and (v) for negative events that
happen to others versus oneself (e.g., Ross, 1977; Weiner, 2006).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The study sample was comprised of undergraduates (N = 240)
recruited from first- and second-year psychology courses at
a research-intensive Canadian university for an online study
in exchange for course credit. Participants’ ages ranged from
17–32 years (Mage = 20), and the majority of participants
were female (75%). After completing a web-based consent
form, students were randomly presented a link to one of
eight experimental conditions (2 × 2 × 2 study design), each
requiring them to read two scenarios reflecting one combination
of three factors outlined in the study hypotheses, namely (i)
a behavior involving procrastination versus delays (e.g., due
to external factors), (ii) a positive versus negative outcome of
that behavior, and (iii) the situation involving oneself versus
another individual. The specific scenario topics were primarily
academic in nature (e.g., applying for student loans, applying
for a research assistant position, conducting an SPSS analysis,
renewing a driver’s license). Below is a sample scenario reflecting
a procrastination event with a positive outcome occurring to
oneself:
You want to apply for a research assistant position. You have
2 weeks to get two letters of reference and to fill out the application
form. You needlessly put it off until the last minute and no
professor is able to write you a letter in time for the deadline.
You apply without the letters, and since no one else applied, the
department decides to give you the position.
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A sample scenario involving an experienced delay with a
negative outcome occurring to oneself:
You are in charge of doing data analysis on SPSS (statistical
software) for a presentation. You decide to begin the analysis
2 weeks prior to the date of the presentation in order to be well
prepared. You do not have SPSS software on your laptop and you
are then forced to go and see your friend in order to use it. You can
only work for a few hours a week because your friend has such a
busy schedule. At the end of the first week your friend informs you
that she accidently deletes the project. You then begin to work on
it all over again. The result is that you can’t get it done in time and
you do very badly on your presentation.
A sample scenario involving procrastination with a negative
outcomes occurring to others:
Michael wants to apply for a research assistant position. He has
two weeks to get two letters of reference and to fill out the
application form. He needlessly puts it off until the last minute and
no professor is able to write him a letter in time for the deadline.
The department says that they will not accept his application
without letters of reference; therefore he does not get the position.
After reading each of the two scenarios in a given
experimental condition (both having the same three-factor
combination), participants responded to three self-report items
on a 6-point rating scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly
agree). The first measure after each scenario consisted of a
manipulation check concerning the extent to which the agent
was perceived as engaging in procrastination. The second and
third measures evaluated to what extent participants perceived
the agent to be morally responsible for the outcome described
as well as blameworthy for the outcome. At the end of the
study, participants were presented with debriefing information
concerning the purpose of the study and dismissed.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Concerning the ANCOVA assumptions, students were randomly
assigned to experimental conditions, satisfying the assumption
of independence of observations. Next, there was a loss of 29
participants due to missing responses on the study measures.
One significant univariate outlier was identified and removed (for
the variable “age” using z-scores with a criterion of p < 0.001,
two-tailed), resulting in the final sample of 210 students. With
respect to normality, the variables of moral responsibility,
blameworthiness, age, and gender were not normally distributed,
as assessed by Shapiro–Wilk’s test (p < 0.05). Finally, although
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was significant
(responsibility; p = 0.015, blameworthiness; p < 0.001),
our experimental conditions had relatively equal numbers of
students, mitigating potential confounds due to high variance
combined with proportionally low sample sizes. Homogeneity of
regression slopes as interaction terms were not significant for age
or gender.
All participants read multiple vignettes, one after the other, in
the same order, each reflecting the same combination of three
experimental factors. Accordingly, analyses of change over time
were not conducted due to possible order effects. Responses for
each pair of items following the two scenarios were averaged
to create three measures assessing perceived procrastination as
a manipulation check [inter-item r(211) = 0.78, p < 0.001;
M = 3.79, SD = 1.97] as well as moral responsibility [inter-
item r(211) = 0.55, p < 0.001; M = 4.19, SD = 1.51]
and blameworthiness [inter-item r(211) = 0.62, p < 0.001;
M = 4.15, SD = 1.58] as dependent measures. In addition,
the extent to which the experimental variable of primary
interest (procrastination versus delay) was uniquely perceived by
participants as reflecting procrastination behavior, was further
evaluated using an independent samples t-test. Results indicated
that participants were indeed able to clearly differentiate
procrastination from delay scenarios, t(209) = 24.21, p < 0.001,
d = 3.33, supporting the efficacy of our main experimental
manipulation. Finally, despite a significant correlation between
moral responsibility and blameworthiness, r(211) = 0.77,
p< 0.001, both dependent measures were retained in subsequent
analyses to evaluate a socio-cognitive as well as more affective
variant of perceived intentionality, respectively.
ANCOVA analyses were conducted to evaluate the effects
of the experimental conditions as independent variables of
Behavior (procrastination versus delay), Outcome (negative
versus positive), and Target (self versus other) on moral
responsibility and blameworthiness as dependent measures.
Age and gender were included as covariates based on prior
research showing older individuals to procrastinate less often
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999)
and males to be more likely to procrastinate than females (e.g.,
Milgram et al., 1995; Pychyl et al., 2002; Steel, 2007). In addition,
correlations and χ2 analyses were conducted to rule out initial
differences between our background variables (age and gender),
the experimental conditions, and the study measures. Although
the results showed no significant differences with respect to the
background variables, age and gender were nonetheless included
as covariates in the study analyses to maintain consistency with
published research and provide a suitably conservative test of
the study hypotheses with respect to previously demonstrated
potential confounds.
Main Analysis
As expected, a main effect was found for Behavior on
blameworthiness showing procrastination (M = 5.40, SD= 0.78)
to be perceived as more blameworthy than delays (M = 3.00,
SD = 1.09), F(1,152) = 272.70, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.64.
Additionally, a significant interaction between Behavior and
Outcome on blameworthiness was observed, F(1,152) = 4.00,
p = 0.05, η2p = 0.03, suggesting that procrastination was seen
as more blameworthy when the outcome was negative. Similarly,
a main effect of Behavior was found on moral responsibility,
F(1,152) = 132.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.47, with results showing
procrastination (M = 5.17, SD = 1.10) to be viewed as involving
more moral responsibility than delays (M = 3.23, SD = 1.20).
Although a significant two-way interaction between Behavior and
Outcome was observed, F(1,152) = 21.43, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.12,
this effect was qualified by a three-way interaction effect,
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FIGURE 1 | Three-way interaction between Behavior, Outcome, and
Target.
F(1,152) = 4.02, p = 0.05, η2p = 0.03. As presented in Figure 1,
participants tended to attribute greater moral responsibility to
procrastination resulting in negative versus positive outcomes,
but only when evaluating other individuals. In contrast, delays
were evaluated as involving lower levels of moral responsibility
when resulting in negative versus positive outcomes, especially
when the delay was experienced by others versus oneself.
To further probe the significant interaction between Target,
Behavior, and Outcome, we examined the simple effects of
Behavior and Outcome by Target level (self versus other).
There was a significant simple interaction effect between
Behavior and Outcome for participants in the “other” condition,
F(1,152) = 19.67, p < 0.001, but not for those in the “self ”
condition, F(1,152)= 3.78, p= 0.054.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated how students perceive
procrastination, as opposed to experienced delays, through the
theoretical lenses of social psychology, experimental philosophy,
and educational psychology. Utilizing an experimental, scenario-
based approach, our results showed students’ intention-related
evaluations of procrastination and delay to be moderated by
the outcome (positive versus negative) as well as who was being
judged (self versus other). First, significant main effects showed
participants to clearly distinguish between procrastination and
delay experiences. In support of Hypothesis 1, students evaluated
procrastination as more blameworthy and morally responsible as
compared to delays.
Second, in accordance with Hypothesis 4, two-way interaction
effects revealed that the degree of responsibility attributed
to oneself or others depended on whether the outcome of
procrastination or delay was positive or negative. Whereas
students who engaged in procrastination were generally
perceived as higher in moral responsibility when the outcome
was negative, delays were instead viewed as less deserving of
moral responsibility when they resulted in failure. Conversely,
positive consequences of procrastination were viewed as
involving less moral responsibility, with success following
delay experiences viewed as higher in moral responsibility
(e.g., giving credit for successful self-regulation). This finding
is consistent with Knobe (2003) who suggests that negative
outcomes with moral implications tend to be immediately
perceived as more intentional in nature. Moreover, this
result is in line with attribution theory in showing failure
despite effort to imply a lack of ability resulting in lower
perceived responsibility and greater sympathy (e.g., Weiner,
2000).
Additionally, an unanticipated three-way interaction
was observed showing this pattern of results to be further
moderated by whether participants were judging themselves or
others. Whereas students generally viewed procrastination
as deserving of moral responsibility following failure,
procrastination that specifically resulted in failure was viewed
as involving more moral responsibility when it happened
to others as opposed to oneself. More specifically, although
students tended to view themselves as morally responsible for
procrastination despite the outcome, they rated other students
less responsible than themselves when procrastination did
not impair performance and more harshly than themselves
when procrastination had negative consequences. This finding
is novel in research on procrastination in showing outcome
and target to moderate perceptions of intentionality and
expands on social-psychological theories of perception biases in
showing individuals to perceive others as more culpable due to
dispositional factors following failure, specifically failure due to
procrastination.
The results from the present study also help explain why
research has consistently shown procrastination to negatively
correlate with academic performance (Kim and Seo, 2015).
According to our results as outlined in Figure 1, students rated
procrastination that resulted in failure as more immoral when
occurring to others than to themselves, thus suggesting that
procrastination may negatively impact student performance in
part due to a relative lack of perceived responsibility for their
study behaviors. This interpretation is consistent with research
suggesting that self-forgiveness for misbehavior requires one
to first take responsibility for the transgression (Wohl et al.,
2010). Finally, information concerning the moral implications
of procrastination is vital for developing intervention programs
to assist students, specifically concerning efforts to promote
adaptive student cognitions (e.g., perceived responsibility)
concerning their procrastination behavior.
Moreover, the present findings contribute to research on
procrastination in highlighting the social implications of this
detrimental behavior in educational settings. Although previous
research has convincingly demonstrated the negative personal
consequences of procrastination with respect to academics
(Schraw et al., 2007) and well-being (Sirois and Pychyl, 2013),
it is limited with respect to its social implications. Given that
perceptions of blameworthiness and responsibility are clearly
linked to tasks that involve social obligation (Eshleman, 2009),
it is perhaps not surprising that procrastination was linked to
intentionality-related beliefs involving others as evaluated using
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both a cognitive measure (responsibility) and more affective
measure (blame; see Weiner, 2006).
Limitations and Future Directions
Multiple limitations are to be considered when interpreting
the results of the present study. First, whereas the present
study followed from recent research on the utility of single-
item self-report measures in motivation and blameworthiness
research (Inbar et al., 2012; Gogol et al., 2014), future studies
employing more intensive qualitative or multi-item measures
(Lay, 1986), as well as objective indicators (e.g., observational
data) are encouraged. Furthermore, the present study did not take
into account the potential influence of other variables such as
demographics (ethnicity or socio-economic status), psychosocial
variables (personality traits), or contextual factors (years in
program, domain). Second, the present study relied on students’
self-report responses to scenario measures warranting further
research to evaluate responses in real time (e.g., experience
sampling methods; Nett et al., 2012) to naturally occurring or
manipulated behavior of an actual target individual. Third, it is
important to note that the main effect for Outcome experimental
condition (positive versus negative) on blameworthiness, as well
as for the 3-way interaction results, were small in magnitude
(effect size, Cohen, 1988; for a critique, see Cortina and
Landis, 2009). Fourth, although age and gender were controlled
for in the analysis, the demographic composition of the
sample (e.g., 75% female, university students) warrants further
research to examine whether our findings generalize across
gender and to populations in other achievement contexts (e.g.,
employment settings). Nevertheless, these preliminary empirical
findings are encouraging in suggesting that moral perceptions
of procrastination and its outcomes do differ in educational
settings depending on whether or not it is occurring to oneself
vs. others, underscoring the importance of further exploring
social perceptions of procrastination in other domains (e.g.,
employment) utilizing more intensive self-report as well as
objective measures.
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